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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS AND BANS  
ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Trevor Shaw 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The 9th Circuit decided to overturn a local California county zoning ordi-
nance that was infringing upon a citizen’s Second Amendment right to own 
and operate a gun store.1 The ordinance stated that any store that sold fire-
arms or operated as a firing range needed to be 500 feet away from the front 
door of the shop to the front door of school zones, government buildings, 
residential areas, and other stores that sell firearms.2 The owners of Valley 
Guns & Ammo found a place located in Alameda County, just outside the 
radius and began working on acquiring the property and renovating it into 
their gun store and firing range.3 During this time period, the county came 
by and informed the owners that they could not operate their gun store at 
the building because their store would be located inside the disqualifying 
radius.4 The building that was to be used had only one door, and the owners 
had measured the distance from the front door to the nearest disqualifying 
property’s front door at 532 feet away.5 The court declined to address the 
factual issue of the county improperly measuring the distance, and instead 
determined the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that regulates the Se-
cond Amendment.6 
The owners of the store appealed the zoning violation, claiming that they 
were outside the radius as described by the statute.7 The county measured 
from the exterior wall of the store to the nearest “residential property line 
rather from door to door,” putting the property 54 feet too close to the clos-
 
 1. Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 2. Id. at 1050.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (“[T]he 500-foot zoning requirement was to be measured from the closest 
door of the proposed business location to the front door of any disqualifying 
property”).  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 1051.  
 7. Id. 
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est disqualifying property marker.8 Once the case reached the 9th Circuit, 
the court overturned the lower court’s decision, holding that the ordinance 
as read and interpreted by the lower court was a violation of the storeown-
er’s Second Amendment rights.9 The court recognized the importance of 
protecting one’s fundamental rights from an overbearing government ordi-
nance.10 This ruling gained a great deal of criticism from the public and the 
fellow judges, especially in the dissent which claimed that this was not a 
Second Amendment claim, but merely a zoning issue made to look like a 
Second Amendment claim.11 
II. BACKGROUND  
A. History of the Second Amendment 
The Second Amendment is one of the core principles rooted in the Con-
stitution, and has been a widely debated subject in recent years.12 The right 
to bear arms was laid out during the founding of this country when the Bill 
of Rights was ratified.13 The Second Amendment is viewed primarily in two 
ways: 1. That it is a collective right, meaning that this right is limited, and is 
available to protect against “overreaching by the national government.”14 
The collective right standpoint views the Second Amendment as a right that 
applies to the states, and somewhat as to the individuals, in the sense that 
they are afforded this right so long as they are enlisted in the state militia to 
prevent a tyrannical government from taking over.15 2. The Second 
Amendment is an individual right, which makes it a broader right for one to 
possess a firearm.16 When viewing the Second Amendment as an individu-
alistic right, proponents look to the portion of the Second Amendment that 
states, “…the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”17 This viewpoint focuses on the fact that the Second Amendment 
is a right that cannot be taken away, and that it applies not just to the states, 
 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 1063.  
 10. Id. at 1055. (citing Minneapolis Stare & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of 
Reveneue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1977)). 
 11. Id. at 1064. 
 12. Cameron Desmond, From Cities to Schoolyards: the Implications of an Individu-
al Right to Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2008) (The discussion of the Second Amend-
ment, mainly about whether it is an individual right or a collective right). 
 13. McDonald V. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 at 769. (stating that the Second Amendment 
is a fundamental right that was established when the United States was founded).  
 14. Desmond, supra note 12, at 1047. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
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but to the individual people as well. 
Today, the landmark case that controls the issue of selling firearms is 
Heller v. District of Columbia, where the court’s decision made clear that 
the Second Amendment was an individualized right.18 In coming to this 
conclusion, the court relied upon the language of the First, Fourth, and 
Ninth Amendments, where the language used makes those rights individual 
rights, and since the Second Amendment uses the same language, the court 
views it as an individual right.19 The court in Heller looked to the language 
of the Second Amendment and determined that the phrases “to keep and 
bear arms”20 and “a well-regulated militia”,21 allowed U.S. citizens to par-
take in the use of a firearm in the home, and the commercial sale of fire-
arms.22 The decision in Heller made it clear that the language of the Second 
Amendment states that we as citizens of the United States are given the 
ability to partake in the purchasing and selling of firearms.23 This is not 
without restrictions though; the court did not conclude that the right to en-
gage in the sale of firearms was to be unregulated.24 It has been a longstand-
ing tradition that there are to be some prohibitions on carrying a firearm in a 
“sensitive area” and who is allowed to own a firearm.25 
B. Post Heller Decisions and their effect on government regulations 
The decision in Heller left open the question of whether the Second 
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.26 The case of McDonald v. City of Chicago dealt with the 
issue of whether a city ordinance prohibiting firearms was constitutional 
under the Second Amendment.27 The Supreme Court held that the Due Pro-
 
 18. David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 
HARV. L.REV. 230 (2014) (The court’s ruling in Heller, protected the rights of a 
business to “provide Second Amendment services. . . regulation of how firearms 
are commercially sold enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, which does not 
extend to prohibitions of firearms sales.”). 
 19. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S.570, 579-80 (2008) (The use of the 
phrase “right of the people” in the first and fourth amendments as well as the se-
cond, refers to the people being able to exercise their rights individually instead 
of collectively). 
 20. U.S. CONST Amend. II. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 631. 
 23. Kopel, supra note 18, at 237. 
 24. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
 25. Id. (Certain people are not allowed to own a firearm such as, felons and the men-
tally ill. There are also certain areas where one is prohibited from carrying a fire-
arm “such as schools and government buildings”). 
 26. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 27. Id. at 750 (Chicago claimed that the Second Amendment did not apply to it be-
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cess Clause encompasses the Second Amendment and as such applies to the 
states, which renders ordinances outlawing firearms unconstitutional.28  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald to strike down the city 
of Chicago’s ordinance, the city council met and came up with another or-
dinance to replace the one that the Supreme Court struck down.29 The new 
code prohibited the use of a firearm outside of a home, the sale of firearms, 
and limited the number of functional firearms a citizen may have.30 The 
new code also employed a rigorous process in order to obtain a permit for a 
firearm31 and prohibited “all shooting galleries, firearm ranges, or any other 
place where firearms are discharged.”32 When the Supreme Court looked at 
the ban on firing ranges, it held that the right to “possess firearms”33 in-
cludes the ability to use those firearms and “maintain proficiency.”34 The 
Supreme Court overruled the district court’s decision and determined that 
the ban on firing ranges was unconstitutionally infringing upon citizens’ 
Second Amendment rights.35 
B. Standard of Review for 2nd amendment claims 
One of the issues surrounding any Second Amendment challenge is the 
standard of review that the court uses to determine the constitutionality of 
the claim.36 The ruling in Heller made clear that the right to sell firearms is 
a qualified right, and because the court left open the question of the stand-
ard of review, we must look to what other courts have decided on this is-
sue.37 While Heller did not set forth the standard of scrutiny necessary for 
 
cause the Bill of Rights is only applicable to the federal government, and not the 
states). 
 28. Id. at 791.  
 29. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. (Must be 21 years old in order to apply for a permit, all firearms must have a 
registration certificate, if under between 18 and 20 must have a parent or guardi-
an’s written consent, and they must also have a permit). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 704. 
 34. Id. (The right to bear arms would not hold much weight if those that were al-
lowed to exercise that right were not able to practice and train with those fire-
arms).  
 35. Id. at 711.  
 36. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (declining to set a standard of 
review for Second Amendment claims). 
 37. Kopel, supra note 18, at 232-33, 236; United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 
1137 (9th Cir. 20132013) (“[I]f all that was required to overcome the right to 
keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be re-
dundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and 
would have no effect.”(quoting Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S.570, 628 
(2008))).  
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Second Amendment claims, other courts have decided to use a heightened 
form of scrutiny.38 The court in United States v. Chovan, held that the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny is determined by a two-part test.39 First, the court 
looks to see if “the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment” then, “if so, directs courts to apply an appropriate level of 
scrutiny.”40 This test leads us to using an intermediate level of scrutiny in 
determining the validity of any regulation revolving around the Second 
Amendment.41 Using this heightened form of scrutiny puts the burden on 
the government to show that the statute/regulation/ordinance is a reasonable 
means of achieving their goal.42 
III. ANALYSIS  
A. How the zoning ordinances can equate to a ban on Second Amendment 
rights 
The court’s ruling in Teixeira is one that secures a fundamental right we 
have as citizens, the right to bear arms, and stops an overbearing govern-
ment from preventing citizens from exercising that right.43 The zoning ordi-
nance in Teixeira44 forces gun store owners to be able use only specific par-
cels of land which, if there are none available, equates to a ban of gun 
stores.45 For future regulations on gun control, it is imperative that the local 
governments authorizing these ordinances and zoning laws be required to 
show that the regulation is substantially related to the government’s inter-
est.46 
When a business is providing a constitutionally protected service, they 
are afforded the right to challenge those ordinances that negatively impact 
their business.47 Since the Supreme Court has determined that the Second 
Amendment is an individual right, when evaluating a violation of one’s 
 
 38. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. 
 39. Id. at 1136.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Teixiera v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 42. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (“(1) The government’s stated objec-
tive to be significant, substantial, or important; and (2) A reasonable fit between 
the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.” (citing U.S. v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010))); see also Ezell, 631 U.S. at 706.  
 43. See Teixeira, 822 F.3d at 1054.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (Forcing zoning regulations to be substantially related 
to the prevention of gun control is necessary in order for the ordinance to be le-
gal).   
 47. Kopel, supra note 18, at 233-234. 
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rights, it is analogous to look at how the court decided other cases involving 
fundamental rights.48 This is exactly what the 7th circuit did; they equated 
the protections afforded to the first amendment to a bookstore selling por-
nography to a local gun ban.49 When we look at these cases involving pro-
hibitions of people being able to exercise their rights, the test of intermedi-
ate scrutiny is the most efficient form the government has to evaluate the 
constitutionality of statutes restricting our Second Amendment rights.50 
B. The future for commercial sale of firearms 
As more regulations for gun control come up, we must be cautious in 
presuming that these regulations are constitutionally valid; they must be 
heavily scrutinized.51 The left leaning ideology regarding the Second 
Amendment has revolved around regulating the Second Amendment be-
cause they view it as a collective right, and their proposals are coming dan-
gerously close to an effective ban on one of our fundamental rights.52 This 
view point focuses on the fact that this right belongs to the states, and only 
in the individual aspect that those in the military are allowed Second 
Amendment rights.53 Were we to apply the collective rights approach, this 
would allow for almost any regulation on firearms to be passed, thus in-
fringing upon our right to bear arms.54 The majority of courts have deter-
mined that the Second Amendment is an individual right and applies to the 
people, not the states.55 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Amendment is an individual right, which makes bans upon gun 
stores and firing ranges unconstitutional.56 
The rule that came down from Heller did not outlaw statutes that regulate 
the commercial sale of arms, but did establish that any regulation that acts 
as a ban against a citizen exercising their Second Amendment right was un-
constitutional.57 Heller’s ruling does not revoke the longstanding traditions 
of preventing “felons and the mentally ill” from purchasing a firearm, or 
that there are sensitive areas where firearms should not be allowed.58 These 
 
 48. Id.  
 49. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
 50. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139. 
 51. Teixiera v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016); Kopel, supra note 
18, at 237 
 52. Desmond, supra note 12, at 1047. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008)).  
 56. See supra notes 31-32. 
 57. Kopel, supra note 18, at 236 (“There is a right to the commercial sale of arms, 
but it is a right that may be regulated by ‘conditions and qualifications’”).  
 58. Id. at 235-36. 
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exceptions to the Second Amendment prove that we as American citizens 
have a “general right to carry firearms,” and because of this, preventing the 
sale of firearms would be unconstitutional.59 In Teixeira, the court used the 
reasoning from Heller to establish the right for gun stores to commercially 
sell firearms, and the right for people to maintain a proficiency in the use of 
a firearm.60 
C. How to Analyze Future Second Amendment Cases 
The Supreme Court stated in Heller that they were to leave open the 
question of what the standard of review should be for a Second Amendment 
right issue.61 Cases following Heller have determined that there must be 
something higher than just a rational basis test, that this fundamental right 
must be given a heightened form of scrutiny.62 While the Supreme Court 
has still not given an answer as to the standard of review, the reasoning of 
Chovan, Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers, McDonald, Ezell, and Teixeira 
should be enough to persuade the court to come down with an intermediate 
level of scrutiny.63 The decision in Chovan, equated the Second Amend-
ment’s scrutiny to that of the First Amendment, being that we must look 
closely at “the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to 
which the challenged law burdens the right.”64 In each of these cases the 
courts apply a heightened level of scrutiny for the Second Amendment, 
based in large part to the specific language of the amendments.65  
The Supreme Court will likely face a case revolving around the issue of 
regulating firearm sales and rights through zoning ordinances, and when 
they do they must view it similarly to that of a person exercising their First 
Amendment rights.66 When looking at ordinances like the ones in Teixeira 
and Ezell, where they essentially say that this right can be exercised else-
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Teixeira v. Cty of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1063 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he County 
has failed to justify the burden it has placed on the right of law-abiding citizens to 
purchase guns.”).  
 61. See supra notes 34, 36. 
 62. See supra note 35. 
 63. United States v Chovan, 737 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Teixeria, 822 F.3d 1047; 
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 64. Chovan, 737 F.3d at 1138 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682; Unit-
ed States v. Marzazarella, 614 F.3d 89, 96-97 (3rd Cir. 2010)). 
 65. See generally Chovan, 737 F.3d 1127; Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of 
Chi., 961 F. Supp. 2d 928 (Ill. Dist. Ct. N. Dist. 2014); McDonald v. City of Chi., 
561 U.S. 742 (2010); Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); Teixei-
ra, 822 F.3d 1047. 
 66. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697. 
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where so it does not need to be exercised within a specified area.67 Were we 
to apply this thinking to the first amendment and prevent citizens from ex-
ercising that right in a city upon the sole factor being that they can go 
somewhere else and exercise that right, we would be effectively banning a 
preexisting right.68 There seems to be a split amongst the circuit courts, be-
cause some have declined to address the issue of a standard of review for 
Second Amendment cases, while others have taken this issue head on in 
cases like Chovan, Teixeira, and Chester. While the lower courts have not 
come to a consensus as to what the standard of review should be, the cases 
that have addressed the issue should provide significant persuasion to the 
Supreme Court to make a final ruling on zoning regulations involving the 
Second Amendment.69 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Teixeira follows the lead of the Supreme Court and other 
jurisdictions who have concluded that the Second Amendment is in fact an 
individual right, and cannot be taken away from the people.70 One of the 
key ideas that this case points out, and many other jurisdictions have reiter-
ated, is that in order to exercise one’s Second Amendment right they must 
be allowed to enjoy that right through commerce.71 Teixeira affirms what 
other courts have already stated; the Second Amendment is not a “second-
class right,” but one of the fundamental rights given to us through the Bill 
of Rights.72 While the Supreme Court still has several issues it needs to ad-
dress in regards to the Second Amendment, they have determined that the 
commerce of firearms is a right that cannot be taken away.73 
 
 67. Id. (The zoning law in Chicago prevented citizens from exercising their right in 
the city based on the idea that they could go elsewhere and exercise that right).  
 68. Id.  
 69. See generally Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 70. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010); see also Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 690. 
 71. Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016) (“One cannot 
truly enjoy a constitutionally protected right when the State is permitted to snuff 
out the means by which he exercises it; one cannot keep arms when the State pre-
vents him from purchasing them.”); See also Illinois Ass’n of Firearms Retailers 
v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“The ban on gun 
sales and transfers prevents Chicagoans from fulfilling, within the limits of Chi-
cago, the most fundamental prerequisite of legal gun ownership—that of simple 
acquisition.”). 
 72. Teixeira, 822 F.3d at 1063 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
780 (2010)) (“The right of law abiding citizens to keep and to bear arms is not a 
‘second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other 
Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”). 
 73. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
